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CLEARING THE AIR: ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE IN
TAKE-HOME ASBESTOS EXPOSURE LITIGATION
Rebecca Leah Levine
Abstract: Since 2005, take-home asbestos exposure claims have constituted a new wave
of asbestos litigation. In contrast to employees exposed to asbestos at a worksite, take-home
exposure occurred among those affected by employees who inadvertently carried asbestos
home on their clothing or their tools. While some jurisdictions have rejected these claims on
the basis that the defendant did not owe a legal duty to the plaintiff, the Washington Court of
Appeals recently recognized the potential validity of a household member’s claim for relief
for the harm he or she suffered as a result of asbestos exposure.1 In doing so, the court
applied an ordinary negligence test and examined the foreseeability of the harm to the
plaintiff as the primary step in determining whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal
duty. Although the Washington State Supreme Court has no precedent governing take-home
asbestos exposure claims specifically, the courts of appeals’ reasoning comports with
Washington negligence law. Accordingly, Washington courts should apply this ordinary
negligence test in future take-home asbestos exposure cases.

INTRODUCTION
“We bring more than a paycheck to our loved ones and family. We
bring asbestosis, silicosis, brown lung, black lung disease. And radiation
hits the children before they’ve even been conceived.”2
While the use of asbestos in the United States has declined
significantly in recent decades,3 asbestos litigation continues to burden
the courts.4 Asbestos litigation is the longest-running mass tort litigation
in the United States.5 In the past, most disputes were limited to the
complaints of workers who were exposed to asbestos in the workplace.6

1. Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579-7-I, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1 (Wash. Ct.
App. Aug. 13, 2007).
2. Sweet Honey in the Rock, “More than a Paycheck,” on BREATHS (Flying Fish 1988) (song).
3. NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE
PROFILES: ASBESTOS, in REPORT ON CARCINOGENS 21, 22 (11th ed., 2005).
4. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., ASBESTOS LITIGATION at xvii
(2005).
5. Id.
6. Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial Impact of S. 852: The Fairness in Asbestos
Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 996–97 (2005).
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Recently, however, plaintiffs include these workers’ household members
who encountered asbestos through “take-home exposure.”7 Take-home
exposure occurs when workers exposed to asbestos in the workplace
carry asbestos particles home on their work clothes, thereby exposing
members of their households to the dangerous substance.8 As household
members develop adverse health outcomes related to their exposure,
they have sought compensation for their injuries from the worker’s
employer through litigation.9
Jurisdictions are mixed in their treatment of take-home asbestos
exposure claims. Currently, seven states permit such claims;10 however,
nine other states have rejected them.11 The key factor that influences
whether a court permits a take-home exposure claim is the methodology
used to analyze negligence. Jurisdictions that tend to permit such claims
begin their analyses by focusing on whether the harm to the plaintiff was

7. Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REV. LITIG. 501, 545–46 (2009).
This Comment uses the term “take-home exposure,” but other sources have identified this issue
using alternative terms such as “bystander,” “secondary,” or “domestic” exposure. See, e.g., Martin
v. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 561 F.3d 439, 444 (6th Cir. 2009) (using the term “bystander
exposure”); Lunsford v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 125 Wash. App. 784, 106 P.3d 808, 809 (2005)
(“At issue in this case is Lunsford’s secondary exposure to asbestos as a child.”); Muriel L.
Newhouse & Hilda Thompson, Mesothelioma of Pleura and Peritoneum Following Exposure to
Asbestos in the London Area, 22 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 261, 261 (1965) (referring to “domestic”
exposure).
8. Behrens, supra note 7.
9. See Williams v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 405 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009); Catania v.
Anco Insulations, Inc., No. 05-1418-JJB, 2009 WL 3855468, at *1 (M.D. La. Nov. 17, 2009);
Condon v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. A102069, 2004 WL 1932847, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31,
2004); Riedel v. ICI Ams. Inc., 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d
208 (Ga. 2005); Simpkins v. CSX Corp., 929 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Van Fossen v.
MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689 (Iowa 2009); Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947
So.2d 171 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Adams v. Owen-Illinois, Inc., 705 A.2d 58 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1998); In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Tex., 740 N.W.2d
206 (Mich. 2007); Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos
Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005); In re Eighth Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 815 N.Y.S 2d 815
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010);
Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008); Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Altimore, 256 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008); Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2007).
10. Catania, 2009 WL 3855468, at *3; Condon, 2004 WL 1932847, at *7; Chaisson, 947 So.2d at
184; Simpkins, 929 N.E.2d at 1266; Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1149; Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 375; Arnold
v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 157 Wash. App. 649, 240 P.3d 162, 174 (2010).
11. Williams, 405 F.3d at 1292; Riedel, 968 A.2d at 19; CSX Transp., 608 S.E.2d at 210; Van
Fossen, 777 N.W.2d at 698; Adams, 705 A.2d at 66; In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth
Dist. Court of Appeals of Tex., 740 N.W.2d at 209-210; In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d at
116; In re Eighth Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 815 N.Y.S 2d at 821; Boley, 929 N.E.2d at 453;
Exxon Mobil Corp., 256 S.W.3d at 425; Alcoa, 235 S.W.3d at 458.
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a foreseeable consequence of the employer’s actions.12 In contrast,
jurisdictions that tend not to uphold such claims focus on the
relationship between the employer and the plaintiff.13
Washington courts use this foreseeability approach when analyzing
negligence claims. The Washington State Supreme Court has held that
for negligence claims, the foreseeability of harm defines the duty that an
actor owes to another.14 In Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc.,15 the
Washington Court of Appeals ruled that a plaintiff could potentially
recover on a take-home asbestos exposure claim under an ordinary
negligence theory of liability.16 The court declared that if the defendant
affirmatively created a risk to Mrs. Rochon, the employee’s at-home
spouse, then it had a duty to protect her from harm arising out of that
risk.17 This unpublished opinion has no binding authority in Washington
courts.18 Nonetheless, applying a similar analysis to future cases would
enable individuals exposed to asbestos to seek redress for their injuries
from those who failed to provide adequate protection.
This Comment argues that the Washington Court of Appeals was
correct in applying an ordinary negligence test to assess whether a
household member has stated a valid claim for take-home asbestos
exposure. Part I provides an overview of asbestos exposure and the
history of asbestos litigation in the United States. Part II addresses
different legal theories that courts and legislatures use to compensate
persons for injuries attributable to asbestos exposure. Part III discusses

12. See, e.g., Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 361 (“The courts that ultimately recognize the existence
of a duty when faced with facts similar to this case have focused on the foreseeability of harm
resulting from the employer’s failure to warn of or to take precautions to prevent the exposure.”).
13. Id. (“The courts that ultimately recognize the existence of a duty when faced with facts
similar to this case have focused on the foreseeability of harm resulting from the employer’s failure
to warn of or to take precautions to prevent the exposure. On the other hand, the courts finding that
no duty exists have focused on the relationship―or lack of a relationship―between the employer
and the injured party.”); see also Martin v. Gen. Electric Co., No. 02-201-DLB, 2007 WL 2682064,
at *5 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2007) (“Courts across the country have significantly disagreed on the
extension of liability in household asbestos exposure cases and have frequently reached opposite
conclusions based on each state’s law and how the law defines a legal duty.”).
14. King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974) (reasoning that the type of
damage suffered as a result of city’s wrongful act was foreseeable, and thus compensable, even
though mechanism of injury was not); Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 Wash. 2d 800, 467 P.2d 292
(1970) (holding that the city could properly be forced to compensate visitor to airplane hangar for
injuries sustained by flying debris; city owed a duty based on foreseeability of injury).
15. No. 58579-7-I, 2007 WL 2325214 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007).
16. Id. at *1, *2.
17. Id. at *4.
18. WASH. R. APP. P. 10.4(h).
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Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., and Part IV argues that the court
in Rochon applied the appropriate negligence test.
I.

THE USE OF ASBESTOS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY HAS
HAD PROFOUND MEDICAL AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES

Asbestos has played a significant role in American industry.19 Despite
the fact that scientific data on the dangers associated with asbestos
exposure began in the early twentieth century,20 workers were
continuously exposed to the substance in the workplace.21 As they
developed adverse health outcomes resulting from their exposure, they
began to seek relief from their employers22 and from manufacturers of
asbestos products.23 Now, as the courts face a new wave of asbestos
litigation in take-home exposure claims,24 Congress has been
unsuccessful in crafting a legislative remedy that meets the needs of all
the interested parties.25
A.

Asbestos, a Naturally Occurring Mineral, Was Widely Used
Commercially Throughout the Twentieth Century

The Toxic Substances Control Act defines asbestos as the
asbestiform26 varieties of chrysotile (serpentine), crocidolite (riebeckite),
amosite (cummingtonite/grunerite), anthophyllite, tremolite, and
actinolite.27 Asbestos fibers are strong and flexible, so that they can be

19. NAT’L CANCER INST., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASBESTOS EXPOSURE AND
CANCER RISK FACT SHEET (2009).
20. Lawrence Garfinkel, Asbestos: Historical Perspective, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 28.36 (Janne Mager Stellman ed., Int’l Labour Org. 5th ed.
1998).
21. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 4, at 11.
22. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Super. Ct., 612 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1980)
(holding that the employer was negligent for fraudulently and negligently concealing the nature and
extent of an employee’s workplace-related injuries when that action aggravated the worker’s
condition).
23. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973); see
also infra text accompanying note 89.
24. Behrens, supra note 7, at 546.
25. Christopher J. O’Malley, Breaking Asbestos Litigation’s Chokehold on the American
Judiciary, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1101, 1111.
26. “Asbestiform” means that the fibers are very flexible and have high tensile strength.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 2642(3) (2006).

09 - 051611_Levine_Final_Read[1].docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]

CLEARING THE AIR

5/28/2011 4:31 PM

363

woven together, and are also resistant to heat and to most chemicals,
making them appealing for industrial use.28
In the United States, asbestos has been mined and used commercially
since the nineteenth century, and its use increased significantly during
World War II.29 Since that time, it has been used widely in the building
and construction industries to reinforce cement and plastic products, as
well as for several other purposes.30 While the demand for asbestos in
the United States increased considerably from 1900 until 1973,31 use of
asbestos declined significantly as information on adverse health
effects—and the resultant potential for liability—increased.32 The last
asbestos mine in the United States closed in 2002,33 and asbestos is no
longer widely used in manufacturing;34 however, it is still used in the
United States in construction and transportation products.35 Because of
the widespread past and present use of asbestos, low levels of asbestos
are present in air, soil, and water, and each person is exposed to it at
some point during his or her life.36

28. Asbestos: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (June 7, 2010),
http://www.epa.gov/asbestos/pubs/help.html. Chrysotile, amosite, anthophyllite, and crocidolite are
the most commercially utilized forms of asbestos, but commercial use of anthophyllite was
discontinued by the 1980s. NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, supra note 3, at 22.
29. NAT’L CANCER INST., supra note 19, at 1.
30. Id. Asbestos has also been used for purposes such as insulation, roofing, fireproofing, and
sound absorption. In the shipbuilding industry, it was used to insulate boilers and pipes. In the
automotive industry, it has been used in brake shoes and clutch pads. Additionally, asbestos has
been used in ceiling and floor tiles, paints, coatings, and adhesives. Id.
31. NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, supra note 3, at 22.
32. Id.
33. BRADLEY S. VAN GOSSEN, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, REPORTED HISTORIC ASBESTOS
MINES, HISTORIC ASBESTOS PROSPECTS, AND ASBESTOS OCCURRENCES IN THE EASTERN UNITED
STATES (2006).
34. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Malignant
Mesothelioma Mortality—United States, 1999–2005, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.,
Apr. 24, 2009, at 396 [hereinafter Mesothelioma Mortality].
35. Id.
36. NAT’L CANCER INST., supra note 19, at 2. Most people do not become ill from their exposure.
People who become ill from asbestos are usually those who are exposed to it on a regular basis,
most often through a job where they work directly with the material or through substantial
environmental contact. Id.
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Knowledge of the Health Effects of Asbestos Exposure Developed
Throughout the Twentieth Century and the Substance Is Now
Universally Recognized as a Human Carcinogen

In the early twentieth century, scientific research on asbestos
exposure focused on occupational health inside the workplace, but
expanded when data revealed that those who had never worked with
asbestos firsthand were becoming ill.37 The first reference to pulmonary
fibrosis, or scarring in the lungs, was in 1906 in England,38 and major
recognition of asbestos-induced disease originated there in 1924.39 In the
United States, asbestosis40 was first described in 1918.41 In 1935, the
first reference to carcinoma of the lung in a patient with “asbestossilicosis” appeared in scientific literature, and reports of lung cancer in
patients who died of asbestosis soon followed.42 In 1955, British
scientist Richard Doll found a high risk of lung cancer in those who had
worked in an asbestos plant for twenty years, and a particularly high risk
in those who had worked at the plant even longer.43 In 1959, J.C.
Wagner recognized the causal connection between asbestos and
mesothelioma.44
Early studies were limited to workers exposed through the mining and
production of asbestos. With the developing body of scientific
knowledge, the New York Academy of Sciences held a conference in
1964 to discuss the adverse health consequences of asbestos exposure.45
At that conference, scientists, including Dr. Irving Selikoff, revealed the
association between workplace asbestos exposure and an increased risk
of death from cancer.46 This research also drew attention to the fact that
othersincluding workers in asbestos production, workers indirectly
37. James Edward Huff et al., A Health View of Asbestos: An Annotated Literature Collection—
1960–1974, 9 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 341, 341 (1974).
38. Garfinkel, supra note 20, at 28.36.
39. Id.
40. See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
41. A. J. LANZA ET AL., SILICOSIS AND ASBESTOSIS 419 (A. J. Lanza ed., 1938).
42. Garfinkel, supra note 20, at 28.36.
43. Richard Doll, Mortality from Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers, 12 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 81
(1955).
44. J.C. Wagner et al., Diffuse Pleural Mesothelioma and Asbestos Exposure in the North
Western Cape Province, 17 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 260 (1960). This study also established the risk of
environmental exposure to asbestos from living near asbestos mines.
45. Huff et al., supra note 37, at 341.
46. Irving J. Selikoff et al., Classics in Oncology: Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia, 34 CA: A
CANCER JOURNAL FOR CLINICIANS 48, 54–55 (1984).
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exposed to asbestos in the workplace, such as shipyard workers, and
family membersmay be exposed as well.47 At the same conference,
researchers Muriel Newhouse and Hilda Thompson presented findings
that take-home asbestos exposure was causally linked to adverse health
effects.48 In their landmark study, they found “little doubt that the risk of
mesothelioma may arise from both occupational and domestic exposure
to asbestos.”49 This study provided key information that the health risks
associated with asbestos exposure are not limited to the workplace, but
could reach those who lived in the worker’s home.50
After scientists highlighted the dangers of asbestos exposure during
the conference, Dr. Selikoff lobbied to educate legislators about the need
to protect Americans from such exposure.51 Congress passed the
Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970 to “assure safe and
healthful working conditions for working men and women.”52 The new
law applied to all persons “engaged in a business affecting commerce
who has employees,” although it only included private sector workers.53
The law established the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) to promulgate safety and health standards and
to enforce compliance by inspecting workplaces and issuing citations to
employers.54
The increasing data on the hazards associated with asbestos exposure
led OSHA to adopt workplace safety regulations in 1972 that
specifically targeted asbestos exposure.55 OSHA’s regulation of asbestos
in 1972 was the agency’s first comprehensive standard.56 Since 1972,

47. Garfinkel, supra note 20, at 28.36–.37.
48. 132 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. (1965), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/nyas.1965.132.issue-1/issuetoc
49. Newhouse & Thompson, supra note 7.
50. Id.
51. Richard Lemen, Assistant Att’y General, U.S. Pub. Health Serv. (Ret.), PowerPoint
Presentation at the American Public Health Association Annual Meeting: Case Study of Asbestos:
History and Epidemiology (Nov. 9, 2010).
52. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, pmbl. tit., 84 Stat. 1590.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (2006).
54. Id. § 655(b).
55. Standards for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318, (June 7, 1972) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a).
56. Workplace Safety and Asbestos Contamination: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 48 (2001) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of R.
Davis Layne, Acting Assistant Sec’y of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health). The rule
reduced the permissible exposure limit and included requirements for protective measures such as
engineering controls, personal protective equipment, air or exposure monitoring, medical
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OSHA has engaged in more rulemaking regarding asbestos than any
other hazard it regulates.57 In addition to setting a permissible exposure
limit for asbestos in the workplace, these regulations required employers
under OSHA’s jurisdiction to provide convenient and sanitary washing
facilities,58 as well as separate changing rooms for employees59 so that
they could avoid removing the substance from the premises.60 Previous
federal and state measures also required employers to provide showering
or changing facilities. However, the goal of those measures was to
reduce the potential harm to the employee from the exposure to the
substance.61
In 1986 and 1987, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and the International Agency for Research on Cancer, respectively,
identified asbestos as a human carcinogen. Asbestos exposure has been
strongly associated with respiratory and other cancers.62 Other adverse
surveillance, work practices, labels, waste disposal, and recordkeeping. Standards for Exposure to
Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. at 11,320–22.
57. Hearing, supra note 56, at 48.
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(d) (2010).
59. Id. § 1910.141(e).
60. Although OSHA regulates the employer-employee relationship, in a hearing in the U.S.
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions in 2001, R. Davis Layne, the Acting
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, testified that the intent of these
regulations was to prevent spreading asbestos outside the workplace. Hearing, supra note 56, at 49.
61. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 744, § 13, 60 Stat. 806, 809 (1946) (now codified at 5
U.S.C. § 7903 (2006)) (“Appropriations available for the procurement of supplies and material or
equipment shall be available for the purchase and maintenance of special clothing and equipment
for the protection of personnel in the performance of their assigned tasks”). The State of
Washington had a law in place prior to 1973 that was similar to the federal statute providing
generally for a safe workplace. Act of Mar. 15, 1919, ch. 130, § 4, 1919 Wash. Sess. Laws 309, 310.
This law was replaced in 1973 with the state version of OSHA. Washington Industrial Safety and
Health Act, ch. 80, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 212 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 49.17.010–.910 (2010)). In 1937, the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries
passed Safety Standards for Protection Against Occupationally Acquired Diseases, pursuant to the
state’s Workmen’s Compensation Act. These standards applied to “every place of employment
where a work or process is carried on by which dust, fumes, vapors, or gases of a harmful nature are
produced or generated . . . which may be inhaled in quantities, or concentrations . . . injurious to
health.” WASH. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., SAFETY STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
OCCUPATIONALLY ACQUIRED DISEASES 9 (1938) (repealed 1970). Employers were required to
provide washing and changing facilities where employees are subject to contamination. However,
the stated purpose of these rules was to protect employees from contamination, and there is no
indication that the goal was to prevent the removal of harmful substances from the premises. Id. at
15–16.
62. Asbestos: Health Effects, AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY,
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/asbestos/asbestos/health_effects/index.html (last updated Apr. 1, 2008).
Some epidemiological data have indicated an association between asbestos exposure and
gastrointestinal and colorectal cancers, and a few have indicated an increased risk of kidney, brain,
larynx, and bladder cancers. Id.
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effects include pleural thickening, pleural plaques, and pleural
effusions.63 Although some forms of asbestos are more hazardous to
human health than others, all forms are hazardous and can cause
cancer.64 Asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancer are the most
prominent adverse health effects of asbestos exposure.65
Asbestosis is a respiratory disease that results from inhaling asbestos
fibers. It causes scar tissue inside the lungs so that the lungs cannot
properly expand and contract. The latency period for asbestosis is about
ten to twenty years following exposure.66 There is no known cure for
asbestosis, and the disease can range from asymptomatic to fatal.67
Malignant mesothelioma is an uncommon cancer tumor of the lining
of the lung and chest cavity, or lining of the abdomen, that is caused
almost exclusively by asbestos exposure.68 This disease may develop
twenty to forty years following initial exposure,69 and the average age of
diagnosis is sixty years old.70 The average patient diagnosed with
malignant mesothelioma lives about nine months.71
For both asbestosis and mesothelioma, there is no defined level of
exposure that leads to adverse health conditions, as each individual
reacts differently to different levels of exposure.72 However, risk factors
such as exposure duration, exposure frequency, exposure concentration,
the size, shape, and chemical makeup of the asbestos fibers, and a
person’s individual risk factors—such as smoking or history of tobacco
use—affect the risk of developing both asbestosis and mesothelioma.73
63. Id. The pleura is the lining of the chest cavity, outside the lung.
64. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, PUBLIC HEALTH STATEMENT:
ASBESTOS 1 (2001).
65. Id.
66. Asbestos, supra note 62.
67. Id.
68. Nat’l Insts. of Health, Mesothelioma—malignant, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/ency/article/000115.htm (last updated June 2, 2010). Mesothelioma occurs in the
mesothelium, which lines the lung, while lung cancer occurs inside the lung. Id.
69. Mesothelioma Mortality, supra note 34, at 393.
70. Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 68.
71. Id.
72. Asbestos: Health Effects, supra note 62.
73. Id. Long and thin asbestos fibers generally reach the lower airways and alveolar regions of the
lung, remaining in the lungs for longer periods of time. They also tend to be more toxic than short
and wide fibers or particles. Wide particles are generally deposited in the upper respiratory tract and
do not reach the lung and pleura, the sites of asbestos-induced toxicity. Short, thin fibers, however,
may also play a role in asbestos pathogenesis. Fibers of amphibole asbestos such as tremolite
asbestos, actinolite asbestos, and crocidolite asbestos remain in the lower respiratory tract longer
than chrysotile fibers of similar dimension. Id.
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Since 1979, an estimated 43,073 people have died of mesothelioma or
asbestosis, including at least 1730 people in Washington.74 Between
1999 and 2005, the most recent years when data are available, it is
estimated that there were 18,068 deaths due to malignant mesothelioma
in the United States. The death rate in Washington State was higher than
the national average.75 The lack of data on the number of injuries that
asbestos exposure has already caused makes it difficult to project the
number of asbestos-related injuries that may manifest in the future.76
C.

Victims of Asbestos Exposure Have Relied upon Administrative
Systems and Litigation to Remedy Their Injuries

As more workers in the United States were exposed to asbestos, they
sought relief for the harm they suffered. In the early twentieth century,
workers sought compensation for their injuries through administrative
systems such as workers’ compensation.77 Initially, workers’
compensation laws covered accidental injuries that took place at definite
times and places and due to sudden and unexpected events, such as a
piece of equipment falling on a worker.78 However, those laws did not
cover occupational diseases, such as asbestosis.79 At that time,
employers fought expansive workers’ compensation laws. They argued
that the employee was at fault for causing the injury, the worker
assumed the risk in taking the job, or that fellow employees were to
blame.80 Unfortunately for employers, the failure to include occupational
74. Government Statistics on Deaths Due to Asbestos Related Diseases, ENVTL. WORKING GRP.,
http://www.ewg.org/sites/asbestos/tables/deathdetails_state.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). It is
challenging to estimate the incidence of asbestos-related health conditions because the data are not
extensive. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health publishes limited data on
deaths from asbestosis, and there is insufficient information available on nonfatal cases. CARROLL,
supra note 4, at xix.
75. Mesothelioma Mortality, supra note 34, at 394. From 1999 to 2005, the total number of
malignant mesothelioma deaths increased 8.9%, from 2482 in 1999 to 2704 in 2005, but the annual
death rate was stable. The national death rate was 13.8 people per million per year, whereas the
death rate in Washington was 20.1 people per million per year. Id.
76. CARROLL, supra note 4, at xix.
77. Kevin Leahy, Asbestos Exposure and the Law in the United States, in ASBESTOS AND ITS
DISEASES 346, 349 (John E. Craighead & Allen R. Gibbs eds., 2008).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 125–26 (2d ed. 1986); see
also JACK MCCULLOUCH & GEOFFREY TWEEDALE, DEFENDING THE INDEFENSIBLE: THE GLOBAL
ASBESTOS INDUSTRY AND ITS FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL 52–53 (2008) (discussing correspondence
between Johns-Manville and Raybestos-Manhattan corporations indicating their interest in limiting
data available to the public on the dangers of asbestos exposure). Beginning in the 1930s, the
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diseases in such laws meant that employees could bring civil suits.81 As
workers’ compensation statutes began to cover dust diseases by the early
1940s, litigation essentially ceased until the 1960s.82 This statutory
compensation, however, was inadequate to meet the employees’ actual
needs83 and provided little incentive for employers to reduce exposure to
dust in the workplace.84
The 1964 New York Academy of Sciences conference renewed the
social and scientific interests in the dangers of asbestos exposure.85 Prior
to this time, lawsuits against non-employers (e.g. asbestos
manufacturers) were rare due to the unavailability of compensation
remedies,86 employers’ efforts to shield claims from the public, 87 and
employers’ efforts to deny culpability.88 However, in 1969, Clarence
Borel, an insulation worker from 1936 to 1939, filed suit against eleven
companies that manufactured insulation materials containing asbestos,89
alleging that the manufacturers had failed to warn of the dangers of
handling asbestos and that as a result he had contracted asbestosis and
mesothelioma.90 In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,91 the
companies also invested in scientific research to generate favorable results and defend existing
working conditions. Id.
81. CASTLEMAN, supra note 80, at 125–26.
82. Leahy, supra note 77, at 351; see Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973); see also infra note 89 and accompanying text.
83. Leahy, supra note 77, at 350. Workers’ compensation laws only provided for half to twothirds of lost wages and did not include compensation for pain and suffering. Additionally, claims
were often challenged based upon issues such as diagnosis and causation. Id. Statutes of limitations
also effectively barred many claims. CASTLEMAN, supra note 80, at 129.
84. Leahy, supra note 77, at 350–51. Workers’ compensation laws mandated that these laws
serve as the exclusive remedy for dust diseases. Consequently, such diseases became accepted
hazards in occupations like mining and manufacturing. Without the threat of lawsuits, employers
had less incentive to provide safe working environments. Id.
85. Huff et al., supra note 37, at 341.
86. Leahy, supra note 77, at 353 (“[N]egligence law . . . did not receive widespread application as
a recovery theory against asbestos product manufacturers during the early part of the previous
century. Product liability . . . developed decades after asbestos illness first appeared and did not
offer tangible returns for claimants as a distinct basis for recovery until the 1960s.”).
87. Id. Discovery during an asbestos case in the 1970s revealed that Johns-Manville settled two
lawsuits in 1957 and 1961 that insulators filed against the company for negligence and breach of
warranty. Id.
88. MCCULLOUCH & TWEEDALE, supra note 80, at 49. In 1929, Pauline Lasin sued her husband’s
employer, Johns-Manville, after her husband died from asbestosis. The company did not deny that
asbestos caused John Lasin’s death, but argued that he assumed the risk of employment, that he
knew or should have known the dangers of asbestos exposure, and that he was negligent in failing to
wear a face mask. Johns-Manville’s attorneys persuaded Pauline Lasin to drop the case. Id.
89. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods., 493 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir. 1973).
90. Id. at 1081.
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Fifth Circuit held the manufacturers, including the Johns-Manville
Corporation, strictly liable for their failure to warn the plaintiff.92 As
compensation, Borel was awarded $68,000.93 In this way, Borel
expanded the scope of liability from employers to companies that
supplied or installed building materials that contained asbestos.94
In 1980, in another suit against the Johns-Manville Corporation, the
California Supreme Court held that workers’ compensation laws did not
bar the plaintiff’s action for his original injury.95 Johns-Manville, which
mined most of the asbestos in the United States, was the leading
manufacturer of asbestos products.96 After Borel, the company faced an
overwhelming number of new claims from former employees suffering
health consequences from asbestos exposure in the workplace.97 The
case also led injured workers to look outside of the employer–employee
relationship to seek compensation.98 Since Borel, most asbestos lawsuits
have been third-party product liability cases.99 The opportunity to sue for
relief instead of seeking workers’ compensation allows claimants to
pursue significantly higher awards for their injuries.100 There were
10,000 cases filed in federal courts from 1980 to 1984.101 In 1982,
Johns-Manville filed for bankruptcy as it faced thousands of pending
claims.102

91. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
92. Id. at 1103. Four firms settled before trial. The trial court instructed a verdict in favor of a
fifth defendant because the plaintiff had failed to show that he had ever been exposed to any of that
company’s product. Id. at 1086; see also Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons: The Consequences
of Asbestos Litigation, 26 REV. LITIG. 583, 589 (2007).
93. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1102.
94. O’Malley, supra note 25, at 1107.
95. Johns-Manville Corp. v. Contra Costa Super. Ct., 612 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1980).
96. O’Malley, supra note 25, at 1107.
97. Carrington, supra note 92, at 589.
98. Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect
Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 54 (2003).
99. O’Malley, supra note 25, at 1123; see also Debra Cassens Moss, Toxic Tort Cases Mounting,
73 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1987, at 30, 30. In such cases, workers that were exposed to asbestos products
sued manufacturers that provided the products to the employers without adequate warning. Id.
100. EDWARD B. RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32286, ASBESTOS LITIGATION:
PROSPECTS FOR LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION, at CRS-2 (2004). While many cases are resolved
through private settlements, for cases in which plaintiffs have succeeded at trial, the average award
has been approximately $1.8 million. Approximately two-thirds of plaintiffs go to trial and receive
monetary awards. Id.
101. Carrington, supra note 92 at 589. There is no documentation of the number of suits in state
courts. Id.
102. Brickman, supra note 6, at 997.
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Just before the Johns-Manville bankruptcy, the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit opened up a new opportunity for asbestos litigants by
extending liability to asbestos defendants’ insurance companies. In
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,103 the court held that
those companies that issued policies at any time between workers’ initial
exposure to asbestos and the actual disease manifestation were liable up
to policy limits for each policy issued each year during that time
frame.104 This ruling provided an incentive for manufacturers to pass the
cases to their insurance companies to compensate employees for their
suffering.105
Beginning in 1972, in order to reduce transaction costs associated
with asbestos litigation, parties began to consolidate cases to encourage
settlements and avoid trials on the merits.106 This increased
consolidation led to an onslaught of new cases facing federal courts.107
Ultimately in 1991, to increase efficiency and avoid trying each case on
the merits, all the asbestos cases pending in the federal courts—
comprised of 26,639 claims in eighty-seven federal districts108—were
consolidated into a single claim.109 As federal courts resisted trying
individual asbestos cases, lawyers sought to encourage settlements by
keeping cases in state courts.110 Additionally, beginning in the late
1990s,111 lawyers actively recruited plaintiffs who were not sick to add
to their consolidated claims,112 encouraging settlements and reducing
transaction costs.113
103. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
104. Id. at 1041.
105. O’Malley, supra note 25, at 1108.
106. Carrington, supra note 92, at 592.
107. Edward Frost, Asbestos Suits Consolidated, 77 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 16, 16.
108. Id. The claims shared issues of punitive damages and “state of the art” medical knowledge at
the time the asbestos was used. The Panel on Multidistrict Litigation noted that at the time of its first
decision regarding consolidating asbestos cases in 1977, only 103 actions were pending in nineteen
federal districts. Id.
109. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 422–24 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
110. Carrington, supra note 92, at 593.
111. Behrens, supra note 7, at 502.
112. Id. at 504.
113. Id. at 509. In the 1994 Georgine Settlement, plaintiff’s attorneys agreed to settle 77,000
asbestos claims against twenty defendants. In exchange, future unimpaired claimants, such as those
with pleural plaques, would not be able to receive compensation until they met certain objective
medical criteria. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994). In 1997, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down this settlement on the basis that “the settling parties achieved a
global compromise with no structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse
groups and individuals affected.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 595 (1997). The
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More recently, a number of judicial and legislative reforms have
returned the focus to sick claimants.114 Some jurisdictions have
implemented inactive dockets that allow plaintiffs who are not sick, but
who were exposed to asbestos, to file suit to comply with the statute of
limitations.115 The court delays resolving the dispute until the plaintiff
provides medical evidence of impairment.116 A number of other
jurisdictions maintain inactive dockets for this purpose, while others
have established expedited dockets to give priority to plaintiffs who have
developed cancer.117 Medical criteria laws118 and judicial and legislative
efforts to limit consolidations have also effectively reduced the
caseload.119
Recently, statutes of limitations have not been significant barriers for
asbestos complainants. Most jurisdictions now hold that the statute of
limitations for long-latency asbestos disease claims begins to run when
plaintiffs discover that they have been injured, rather than from the time
they were first exposed.120 However, jurisdictions vary on whether
nonmalignant diseases, such as pleural thickening, are compensable,121

Court noted that a nationwide administrative claims regime would provide the best means for relief.
Id.
114. Behrens, supra note 7, at 507.
115. Id. In Washington State in 2002, King County Superior Court Judge Sharon Armstrong
established an inactive docket to allow asbestos plaintiffs “who are asymptomatic, who suffer from
only mild reduction in lung function, or whose reduced lung function is not attributed by competent
medical opinion to asbestos-related disease” to file suit to comply with the statute of limitations, but
delay resolving the dispute until the plaintiff experiences significant functional impairment.
Memorandum of the Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc. in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Establish an Unimpaired Docket 27, In re Asbestos Litig., No. 2004-03964 (Tex. May 3, 2004).
116. Behrens, supra note 7, at 507.
117. CARROLL, supra note 21, at 26.
118. Behrens, supra note 7, at 505. Beginning in 2004, a number of states enacted statutes
requiring claimants to meet particular medical criteria in order to proceed with a claim. Such states
include Ohio, Texas, Florida, Kansas, South Carolina, and Georgia. Id. at 506.
119. Id. at 510–12. Consolidating cases was a successful approach to force defendants to settle
with low transaction costs to plaintiffs. State legislatures have enacted laws requiring individual
trials in asbestos cases, while state courts have adopted measures such as amending the state’s rules
of civil procedure, implementing administrative orders to prohibit the joinder of asbestos cases with
different claims, and severing multi-plaintiff asbestos-related cases. These actions have reduced the
number of claims by removing economic incentives for plaintiffs to file less serious claims that have
had little value unless joined with more serious ones. Id.
120. CARROLL, supra note 21, at 25. In the past, state statutes of limitations placed greater
restrictions on asbestos claims. Id.
121. Id.
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and some courts allow compensation for fear of developing a disease
related to asbestos exposure or for medical monitoring.122
Because take-home asbestos exposure cases are rooted in state tort
law, forum shopping is an occurring phenomenon. For example, in Sales
v. Weyerhaeuser,123 an Arkansas resident sued a Washington corporation
alleging that take-home exposure caused him to develop
mesothelioma.124 The Washington State Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens allowed it to consider the effect of
removal to another jurisdiction.125 Limiting removal allows victims to
pursue litigation at a faster pace, which positively affects plaintiffs
because conditions such as mesothelioma can lead to death a short time
after symptoms manifest.126
In the past, most asbestos litigation concerned adverse health effects
that employees experienced following occupational exposure to asbestos
in the workplace. Since 2005, there has been an increase in the number
of cases that have concerned employees’ household members who have
experienced adverse health effects after the employees carried asbestos
home on their work clothes or tools.127 Because these individuals

122. Plaintiffs exposed to asbestos have made claims for mental distress based on their fear of
developing cancer in the future. See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S.
424, 427 (1997); In re Asbestos Litig. Leary Trial, Nos. 87C-09-24, 90C-09-79, 88C-09-78, 1994
WL 721763, at *3–5 (Del. Super. Ct. June 14, 1994); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 233
(Pa. 1996); Temple-Inland Forest Prod. Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d 88, 89 (Tex. 1999). Claimants
have also sought medical monitoring. See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 30
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Simmons, 674 A.2d at 239; see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental
Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 818 (2002). Such cases are premised on the
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress and draw on that theory for recovery; however, the
cases rarely explain whether the underlying theory of recovery is strict liability or negligence. See
Henderson & Twerski, supra.
123. 163 Wash. 2d 14, 177 P.3d 1122 (2008).
124. Id. at 15, 177 P.3d at 1122.
125. Id. at 24, 177 P.3d at 1127. The Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to consider the effect of trying the case in federal court, rather than state court, on the ease,
speed and expense of litigation.
126. Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 68.
127. Williams v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp, 405 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005); Catania v.
Anco Insulations, No. 05-1418-JJB, 2009 WL 3855468, at *1 (M.D. La. Nov. 17, 2009); Riedel v.
ICI Ams., 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009); CSX Transp. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 2005);
Simpkins v. CSX Corp., 929 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy
Co., 777 N.W.2d 689 (Iowa 2009); Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So.2d 171 (La. App.
2006); In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Tex., 740 N.W.2d
206 (Mich. 2007); Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos
Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005); In re Eighth Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 815 N.Y.S.2d 815
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Boley v. Goodyear, 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010); Satterfield v. Breeding
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developed adverse health outcomes as a consequence of their exposure
to asbestos and a number of courts have begun to recognize the potential
validity of their claims,128 these cases represent an increasing proportion
of asbestos litigation.
D.

Congress Has Tried Unsuccessfully to Reduce the Burden on the
Courts from Asbestos Claims

In 1990, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist
appointed the Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation “to address the
substantial number of asbestos personal injury cases and the complex
issues they present.”129 Noting the problem in both state and federal
courts, the Committee concluded: “[T]he resulting delays and costs have
resulted in a denial of justice and fundamental unfairness to litigants.”130
In order to better serve litigants and the judiciary, the Committee called
upon Congress to develop a legislative remedy to resolve asbestos
disputes.131 Additionally, the Judicial Conference called upon its
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to direct the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to study whether to amend Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure132 to accommodate the demands
of mass tort litigation.133
Insulation, 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008); Exxon Mobil v. Altimore, 256 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. Ct. App.
2008); Alcoa v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
128. Catania, 2009 WL 3855468, at *1; Condon v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. A102069, 2004
WL 1932847, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004); Simpkins, 929 N.E.2d 1257; Chaisson, 947 So.2d
171; Olivo, 895 A.2d 1143; Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d 347; see also NAT’L INSTITUTE FOR
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, PUB. NO. 95-123, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON WORKERS’
HOME CONTAMINATION STUDY CONDUCTED UNDER THE WORKERS’ FAMILY PROTECTION ACT (29
U.S.C. 671A), at 6 (1995) (“Although many past uses of asbestos have been abandoned, and
asbestos uses and occupational exposures are now subject to regulation, potential exposures of
family members in the United States may still exist . . . .”).
129. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE AD HOC
COMMITTEE 33 (1991) [hereinafter REPORT].
130. Id.
131. Id. (“Accordingly, the Committee recommended . . . that Congress consider a national
legislative scheme . . . with the objectives of achieving timely appropriate compensation of present
and future asbestos victims and of maximizing the prospects for the economic survival and viability
of the defendants. As a back-up position, the Committee recommended, and the Conference agreed,
that Congress consider legislation expressly to authorize consolidation and collective trial of
asbestos cases in order to expedite disposition of cases in federal courts with heavy asbestos
personal injury caseloads.”).
132. Id. Rule 23 governs the procedure and conduct of class action suits brought in Federal
courts. The rule permits three categories of actions. Rule 23(b)(1) permits a class action if individual
actions by members of the class (1) would create a risk of inconsistent decisions, or (2) would
impair the interests of other class members who are not actually part of the individual cases. Rule
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Congress has acknowledged the problem that asbestos litigation has
caused for the courts, taxpayers, and victims of exposure. In considering
asbestos legislation in 2005, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that:
[a]sbestos litigation has overwhelmed both federal and state
court systems; 77 companies have gone into bankruptcy, with
more on the brink, due to the rising tide of asbestos claims; and
thousands of impaired asbestos victims have received pennies on
the dollar since many of the companies liable for their exposure
have gone into bankruptcy.134
Despite these concerns, Congress has yet to pass legislation to manage
the asbestos caseload.135 Some of the most significant barriers include
determining who would fund any compensation scheme that the
legislation established, establishing medical criteria for individuals to
qualify for compensation, forecasting the future caseload, and resolving
statute of limitation issues.136 Legislation that has been considered in
Congress has involved a number of different approaches to easing the
burden of asbestos litigation on the courts and expediting the
compensation process for claimants. While both chambers of Congress
have considered asbestos litigation measures—and a number of
measures were advanced through committees of jurisdiction and floor
votes—none have successfully passed in both chambers of Congress.137
23(b)(2) permits a class action if the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive or declarative relief appropriate to
the entire class. Rule 23(b)(3) permits a class action when the court finds that questions of law or
fact common to the class members predominate, and that a class action is superior to all other
alternatives for dealing with the issue or issues. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
133. REPORT, supra note 129, at 33. The Federal Judicial Center conducted the study from 1994
to 1995 at the advisory committee’s request. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 3 (1996). The purpose of the study was to provide
systematic, empirical information about how Rule 23 operates. Id. The Center concluded that there
was not substantial litigation over the appropriate Rule 23 category to apply, that judges tend to rule
promptly on the merits of claims before ruling on class certification, and that there were limited
opportunities for appeal of certification rulings before final judgment. Id. at 90. Accordingly, there
was not enough systematic data at the time to determine whether to amend Rule 23. Id. at 91.
134. 151 CONG. REC. 13105, 14053 (2005).
135. On May 26, 2005, after six Judiciary Committee markup sessions, the Committee approved
the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act (FAIR Act), S. 852, 109th Cong. (2005). O’Malley,
supra note 25, at 1121 (discussing the Committee’s passage of the Act). However, in 2006, the
Senate adjourned without passing the bill. Id. at 1123.
136. Carrington, supra note 92, at 596–97.
137. See Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act (FAIR Act), S. 3274, 109th Cong. (2006);
Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act (FAIR Act), S. 852, 109th Cong. (2005); Fairness in
Asbestos Injury Resolution Act (FAIR Act), H.R. 1360, 109th Cong. (2005); Asbestos
Compensation Fairness Act of 2005, H.R. 1957, 109th Cong. (2005); Fairness in Asbestos Injury
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Given the publicity and political tension surrounding asbestos
litigation,138 Congress has yet to reach a compromise.
II.

TAKE-HOME EXPOSURE CLAIMANTS ARE SEEKING
RELIEF THROUGH LITIGATION AND JURISDICTIONS ARE
SPLIT ON RECOGNIZING CLAIMS

Take-home exposure cases139 represent a new trend in asbestos
litigation as a growing number of jurisdictions are ruling on these
claims.140 These jurisdictions are generally split into two categories:
those that focus on the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiff resulting
from the employer’s failure to take protective measures, and those that
focus on the relationship between the employer and the plaintiff.141
Jurisdictions in the first category are more plaintiff-friendly and
generally uphold take-home exposure claims.142 Conversely,
jurisdictions that place more emphasis on the relationship between the
parties largely favor defendants.143 In addition, some jurisdictions place
Resolution Act (FAIR Act), S. 2290, 108th Cong. (2004); Asbestos Claims Criteria and
Compensation Act, S. 413, 108th Cong. (2003); Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act (FAIR
Act), S. 1125, 108th Cong. (2003); Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act (FAIR Act), H.R.
1586, 108th Cong. (2003); Asbestos Compensation Act, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. (as reported by H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, July 24, 2000); Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act, S. 758, 106th
Cong. (1999); Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong. (1999).
138. Susan Kostal, Asbestos They Can?, 91 A.B.A. J., June 2005, at 20, 20.
139. Although this Comment distinguishes between litigation regarding primary and secondary
exposure, in some instances, both an employee and a household member together seek
compensation for the harm they suffered from the employee’s primary exposure to asbestos. See,
e.g., Arnold v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 157 Wash. App 649, 240 P.3d 162 (2010).
140. Behrens, supra note 7, at 545–46.
141. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 361 (Tenn. 2008) (“The courts that
ultimately recognize the existence of a duty when faced with facts similar to this case have focused
on the foreseeability of harm resulting from the employer’s failure to warn of or to take precautions
to prevent the exposure. On the other hand, the courts finding that no duty exists have focused on
the relationship-or lack of a relationship-between the employer and the injured party.”); see also
Martin v. Gen. Electric Co., No. 02-201-DLB, 2007 WL 2682064, at *5 (E.D.Ky. Sept. 5, 2007)
(“Courts across the country have significantly disagreed on the extension of liability in household
asbestos exposure cases and have frequently reached opposite conclusions based on each state’s law
and how the law defines a legal duty.”).
142. See, e.g., Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1149 (N.J. 2006) (“[T]o the extent
Exxon Mobil owed a duty to workers on its premises for the foreseeable risk of exposure to friable
asbestos and asbestos dust, similarly, Exxon Mobil owed a duty to spouses handling the workers’
unprotected work clothing based on the foreseeable risk of exposure from asbestos borne home on
contaminated clothing.”).
143. See, e.g., Riedel v. ICI Ams., 968 A.2d 17, 26 (Del. 2009) (holding that defendant’s
newsletters regarding off-the-job safety did not establish a legal duty; plaintiff and defendant are
“legal strangers in the context of negligence”).
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limitations on the scope of eligible claims based upon the year that the
plaintiff was exposed to asbestos.144
A.

Jurisdictions Focusing on the Foreseeability of the Harm to the
Household Member Tend to Uphold Take-Home Exposure Claims

Victims of take-home asbestos exposure cannot utilize the same legal
remedies as employees exposed to asbestos at the worksite. Because
they are not employees, they may not file workers’ compensation
claims145 or sue on an employer liability negligence theory.146 Likewise,
household members who have never been present on the employer’s
premises cannot sue for negligence based on premises liability.147
Six states, including Washington, have upheld take-home asbestos
exposure claims, all under a negligence theory of liability.148 Those

144. See Catania v. Anco Insulations, No. 05-1418-JJB, 2009 WL 3855468, at *1 (M.D. La. Nov.
17, 2009) (holding that the risk of employees carrying asbestos home on their clothing was
foreseeable). The Walsh–Healey Act required employers to provide a change of clothing to
employees to prevent them from carrying asbestos home. Even though the Act only applied to
federal contractors, it demonstrated an awareness of the dangers of asbestos exposure. Additionally,
the Louisiana legislature recognized asbestosis as an occupational disease as of 1952. Id.; Exxon
Mobil v. Altimore, 256 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. 2008) (concluding, based on witness testimony, that by
1972, experts agreed that a certain degree of exposure to asbestos could cause asbestosis or cancer);
Alcoa v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. 2007) (holding that the Walsh–Healey Act only applied
to workers, and therefore “did not put employers on notice of the hazards of non-occupational
exposure to asbestos”).
145. Under Washington law, workers’ compensation provides an exclusive remedy for workers
injured on the job. See, e.g., Doty v. Town of S. Prairie, 155 Wash. 2d 527, 120 P.3d 941 (2005)
(trial court erroneously dismissed claim brought by volunteer firefighter); Gorman v. Garlock, Inc.,
155 Wash. 2d 198, 118 P.3d 311 ( 2005) (trial court properly dismissed claim based on coverage of
the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act); Garibay v. State, 131 Wash. App. 454,
128 P.3d 617 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (trial court properly dismissed claim against Department of
Labor & Industries for failure to enforce safety regulations); Crow v. Boeing Co., 129 Wash. App.
318, 118 P.3d 894 (2005) (trial court properly dismissed claim against employer where injury was
unintentional); see also Schuchman v. Hoehn, 119 Wash. App. 61, 79 P.3d 6 (2003) (14-year-old
employee’s serious injuries were covered by remedies and limitations of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 52.24.020; no violation of public policy favoring protection of children, nor of the Equal
Protection Clause).
146. Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579-7-I, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1, *4 (Wash.
App. Aug. 13, 2007). (“Employers generally owe their employees a duty to provide a reasonably
safe work environment . . . Mrs. Rochon was not an employee of Kimberly-Clark, and she cites to
no Washington case extending liability to family members of employees under this theory.”).
147. Id. at *5. (“Mrs. Rochon cannot escape the fact that she has not alleged that she entered
Kimberly-Clark’s land. And she cites no Washington case extending liability under this theory to
persons who were not at least adjacent to the real property in question.”).
148. Condon v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. A102069, 2004 WL 1932847, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 31, 2004); Simpkins v. CSX Corp., 929 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Chaisson v.
Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So.2d 171 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d
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jurisdictions upheld the claims on the basis that the harm to the plaintiff
was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions.149 Plaintiffs
have utilized a number of methods to establish that the defendant knew
or should have known that the harm to them was foreseeable at the time
of exposure.
Some of these courts have highlighted the defendant’s internal data to
demonstrate that the employer had the requisite knowledge.150 For
example, in a case against Exxon Mobil, the New Jersey Supreme Court
cited a 1937 report that was specifically prepared for the petroleum
industry.151 Additionally, the court found that as early as 1916, industrial
hygiene texts recommended that plant owners provide workers with the
opportunity to change in and out of their work clothes to prevent them
from bringing home contaminants on their clothes.152 Because Exxon did
not provide workers with an opportunity to change their clothes at the
worksite, the risk to the plaintiff was foreseeable.153
1143 (N.J. 2006); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation, 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008); Rochon, 2007
WL 2325214, at *1.
149. See, e.g., Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 367 (“[Defendant] was aware of the presence of
significant quantities of asbestos fibers on its employees’ work clothes. It was also aware of the
dangers posed by even small quantities of asbestos and that asbestos fibers were being transmitted
by its employees to others. Nevertheless, despite its extensive and superior knowledge of the
dangers of asbestos, [defendant] allegedly (1) failed to inform its employees that they were working
with materials containing asbestos; (2) failed to provide its employees with or to require them to
wear protective covering on their clothes; (3) actively discouraged its employees’ use of on-site
bathhouse facilities for changing or cleaning; and (4) failed to inform its employees of the dangers
posed by the asbestos fibers on their work clothes. Under these circumstances, it was foreseeable
that Ms. Satterfield would come into close contact with Mr. Satterfield’s work clothes on an
extended and repeated basis.”).
150. See, e.g., Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1149; see also Condon, 2004 WL 1932847, at *2 (finding that
expert testimony demonstrated requisite internal knowledge of the dangers that asbestos posed to
both employees and household members). In Condon, an expert for the plaintiff testified that the
defendant was a member of the American Petroleum Institute. Id. He explained that as early as the
beginning of the twentieth century, the group’s medical advisory committee was aware of research
that linked lung cancer to industrial carcinogens. Id. Additionally, he cited recognition in the United
States and England that workers handling toxic substances should have separate lockers for work
and street clothes to prevent their families from being exposed to toxic dust from the workers’
clothes. Id. In both Condon and Olivo, the workers worked for independent contractors, rather than
for the premises owners themselves. However, the courts reasoned that a premises owner, not the
independent contractor, is liable for the harm where the premises owner controls the worksite
conditions that contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. Condon, 2004 WL 1932847, at *7; Olivo, 895
A.2d at 1151.
151. Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1149. The report discussed the hazards associated with “occupational
dust,” including asbestos particles, which were pervasive at petroleum plants. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (“[Plaintiff’s husband’s] soiled work clothing had to be laundered and Exxon
Mobil . . . should have foreseen that whoever performed that task would come into contact with the
asbestos that infiltrated his clothing . . . .”). An appeals court in Illinois also relied upon this

09 - 051611_Levine_Final_Read[1].docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]

CLEARING THE AIR

5/28/2011 4:31 PM

379

Other jurisdictions have relied upon a statutory or regulatory duty to
establish that the harm to the household member was a foreseeable
consequence of the defendant’s actions. In Exxon Mobil v. Altimore,154 a
Texas court of appeals concluded that OSHA’s 1972 asbestos rule155
represented a consensus within the scientific community that there was
no safe level of asbestos exposure.156 Other courts have pointed to the
1936 passage of the Walsh–Healey Act157 as effective notice of the risks
of take-home exposure by requiring employers to provide a change of
clothing.158
In addition to foreseeability, courts that upheld take-home exposure
claims have considered a number of policy factors in determining
whether a defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff.159 Such factors include
argument in noting that an employee’s soiled work clothing must be laundered, and therefore, the
defendant should have foreseen the risk to the plaintiff. The court declined to decide whether the
duty should extend beyond immediate family members to include those “who regularly come into
contact with employees who are exposed to asbestos-containing products.” Simpkins v. CSX Corp.,
929 N.E.2d 1257, 1266 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
154. 256 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).
155. Standards for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318, 11,320 (June 7, 1972) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a).
156. Exxon Mobil, 256 S.W.3d at 422. State courts in Louisiana and Tennessee followed Texas’s
recognition of 1972 as a proper point in time after which to hold defendants accountable. Chaisson
v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So.2d 171, 183 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation
Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tenn. 2008).
157. Walsh–Healey Public Contracts Act, ch. 881, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936) (codified as amended at
41 U.S.C. §§ 35–45 (2006)). The Walsh–Healey Public Contracts Act establishes minimum wage,
maximum hours, and safety and health standards for work on government contracts. Id.
158. See, e.g., Catania v. Anco Insulations, Inc., No. 05-1418-JJB, 2009 WL 3855468, at *1
(M.D. La. Nov. 17, 2009). The federal district court held that the Walsh–Healey Act “addressed the
hazards of asbestos and required that employers provide a change of clothing to employees to
prevent them from carrying asbestos home.” Id. at *2. It cited the Louisiana Supreme Court in
declaring that the Act indicated knowledge that asbestos posed a “serious problem.” Id. Based on
that knowledge, in combination with the fact that the Louisiana legislature defined asbestosis as an
occupational disease in 1952, the court held that risk to the plaintiff from the employee carrying
asbestos home on his work clothes was foreseeable. Id.
159. See, e.g., Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 365 (“[C]ourts have considered, among other factors: (1)
the foreseeable probability of the harm or injury occurring; (2) the possible magnitude of the
potential harm or injury; (3) the importance or social value of the activity engaged in by the
defendant; (4) the usefulness of the conduct to the defendant; (5) the feasibility of alternative
conduct that is safer; (6) the relative costs and burdens associated with that safer conduct; (7) the
relative usefulness of the safer conduct; and (8) the relative safety of alternative conduct.”); see also
Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1148–49 (N.J. 2006) (“Once the foreseeability of an
injured party is established, the determination of whether imposing a duty is fair involves weighing,
and balancing several factors-the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the
opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.” (internal
citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Devs., 675
A.2d 209, 212 (N.J. 1996))); Simpkins v. CSX Corp., 929 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)
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the foreseeable likelihood of the injury,160 the nature of the risk,161 the
alternative conduct,162 the burden on the defendant in protecting the
plaintiff from the risk,163 and the social value of the defendant’s
activity.164 Based on these considerations, courts have held that there
was a high likelihood of injury to the plaintiff relative to the burden on
the defendant to take protective measures.165 Therefore, it was proper to
hold the defendant employer responsible for not only protecting its
employees but also for protecting against take-home exposure.166
B.

Jurisdictions Focusing on the Relationship Between the Employer
and the Household Member Tend to Reject Take-Home Exposure
Claims

Jurisdictions that do not consider foreseeability in the duty analysis
tend to hold that an employer does not owe a duty to an employee’s
(“Whether a relationship exists between the parties that will justify the imposition of a duty depends
upon four factors: (1) the foreseeability of the harm, (2) the likelihood of the injury, (3) the
magnitude of the burden involved in guarding against the harm, and (4) the consequences of placing
on the defendant the duty to protect against the harm . . . . As a matter of public policy, it is best to
place the duty to protect against a harm on the party best able to prevent it.”).
160. See, e.g., Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 365 (considering “foreseeable probability of the harm or
injury occurring”).
161. See id. (considering “possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury”); see also Olivo,
895 A.2d at 1148–49 (considering “nature of the attendant risk” (citing Carvalho, 675 A.2d at
212)).
162. See, e.g., Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 365 (“[C]ourts have considered . . . (5) the feasibility of
alternative conduct that is safer; (6) the relative costs and burdens associated with that safer
conduct; (7) the relative usefulness of the safer conduct; and (8) the relative safety of alternative
conduct.”); Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1148–49 (considering “public interest in the proposed solution”
(citing Carvalho, 675 A.2d at 212)).
163. See, e.g., Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1148–49 (considering “opportunity and ability to exercise care”
(citing Carvalho, 675 A.2d at 212)).
164. See, e.g., Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 365 (considering “the importance or social value of the
activity engaged in by the defendant”).
165. See, e.g., Simpkins v. CSX Corp., 929 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“We find that
the burden of guarding against take-home asbestos exposure is not unduly burdensome when
compared to the nature of the risk to be protected against.”).
166. Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So.2d 171 (La. Ct, App. 2006). The court limited the
duty to workers’ household members to account for policy concerns. It held that a reasonable
company that “was aware of the 1972 OSHA regulations regarding the hazards of household
exposure to asbestos, had a duty to protect third party household members from exposure to
asbestos from a jobsite it knew contained asbestos.” Id at 183. In contrast, in Satterfield, the court
concluded: “[T]he duty we recognize today extends to those who regularly and repeatedly come into
close contact with an employee’s contaminated work clothes over an extended period of time,
regardless of whether they live in the employee’s home or are a family member.” 266 S.W.3d at
374. In Olivo, the Court emphasized that the duty would be limited based on the foreseeability of
the harm to the particular plaintiff. 895 A.2d at 1150.
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household member regarding the risk of take-home asbestos exposure.
Courts in Maryland,167 Georgia,168 New York,169 Michigan,170
Kentucky,171 Texas,172 Delaware,173 Iowa,174 and Ohio175 refused to
uphold plaintiffs’ take-home exposure claims, primarily on the basis that
there was no legal relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant.176 In those jurisdictions, the courts based their analyses on the
policy concern with extending a duty to “legal strangers.”177 For
example, the Supreme Court of Georgia does not examine the
foreseeability of the injury to determine whether a duty exists.178 Rather,
in analyzing a take-home exposure claim, the Court held that while an
employer has a duty to provide a safe work environment for its
employees, “those to whom [the defendant] would owe the duty
advanced by the plaintiffs were not at the time of the alleged breach of
duty employees of [the defendant] and were not exposed to any danger
in the workplace, so that duty was not owed to them.”179 In its reasoning,

167. Adams v. Owen-Illinois, 705 A.2d 58 (Md. 1998).
168. Williams v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp, 405 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009); CSX Transp.
v. Williams, 608 S.E. 2d 208 (Ga. 2005).
169. In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005); In re Eighth Judicial Dist.
Asbestos Litig., 815 N.Y.S 2d 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
170. In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Tex., 740 N.W.2d
206 (Mich. 2007).
171. Martin v. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co., 561 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2009).
172. Exxon Mobil v. Altimore, 256 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008); Alcoa v. Behringer, 235
S.W.3d 456 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
173. Riedel v. ICI Ams., 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009).
174. Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689 (Iowa 2009).
175. Boley v. Goodyear, 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010).
176. See, e.g., In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 119 (N.Y. 2005) (“[F]oreseeability
bears on the scope of a duty, not whether a duty exists in the first place.”); see also Riedel, 968 A.2d
17, 26–27 (Del. 2009) (holding that the defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff because the
plaintiff and the defendant were “legal strangers in the context of negligence”).
177. See, e.g., Riedel, 968 A.2d at 26–27 (defendant’s newsletters regarding off-the-job safety did
not establish a legal duty; plaintiff and defendant are “legal strangers in the context of negligence”);
CSX Transp. v. Williams, 608 S.E. 2d 208, 210 (Ga. 2005) (“[W]e decline to extend on the basis of
foreseeability the employer’s duty beyond the workplace to encompass all who might come into
contact with an employee or an employee’s clothing outside the workplace.”); Adams v. OwenIllinois, 705 A.2d 58, 66 (Md. 1998) (holding that employer did not owe a duty to strangers based
upon duty to provide a safe workplace for employees; concern about extending employer’s duty too
far); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d at 119 (expressing policy concern of limitless liability
and holding that “foreseeability bears on the scope of the duty, not whether a duty exists in the first
place”).
178. CSX Transp., 608 S.E. 2d at 210.
179. Id. at 209.
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the court applied a very narrow view of the duty that the defendant owed
to another party.
Taking a different approach, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
an employer could not be held liable for a failure to act.180 The Court
followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts in holding that the
legislature, not the court, would have to create a new duty in order to
hold the defendant liable.181 In the absence of federal legislation to
reduce the asbestos caseload, two states adopted their own solutions.
State legislatures in Kansas and Ohio managed take-home exposure
cases by barring claims against premises owners unless the exposure
occurred at the owner’s property.182 By refusing to recognize claims for
take-home asbestos exposure, courts and state legislatures leave
household members unable to seek relief from those parties who caused
their injuries.
III. THE WASHINGTON COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
APPLIED THE STATE SUPREME COURT’S ORDINARY
NEGLIGENCE TEST IN ROCHON
The Washington State Supreme Court has yet to decide a take-home
asbestos exposure claim. But like the five states that have upheld
negligence claims for take-home exposure, the Washington State
180. Riedel, 968 A.2d at 22. The plaintiff did not allege misfeasance during the trial, so the
Delaware Supreme Court would not allow her to make that argument on appeal. Id. at 23. The Court
followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts in its analysis. Id. at 20. It refused to adopt the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, which permits the court to decide whether a duty exists. Id. at 21.
However, in applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Delaware Supreme Court
concluded was consistent with its own precedent, the Court held that the legislature was responsible
for determining whether a duty exists as a matter of social policy. Id. at 20. In declining to create a
new duty, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the employer’s publishing a newsletter
regarding maintaining safe homes established a legal duty. Id. at 26. Moreover, the employer did not
undertake a duty to warn employees’ families of all dangers. Id. at 17. The court found, like the trial
court, that the employer did not undertake a duty to warn its employees’ families of all
dangers. Therefore, the plaintiff and the defendant were “legal strangers in the context of
negligence.” Id. at 26–27.
181. Id. at 20.
182. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941(A)(1) (West 2010) (“A premises owner is not liable for
any injury to any individual resulting from asbestos exposure unless that individual’s alleged
exposure occurred while the individual was at the premises owner’s property.”). In Boley v.
Goodyear, 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that this state statute
effectively prohibits take-home exposure claims against employers. The concurring opinion notes
that the plaintiff may have an action against the asbestos manufacturer or supplier, which are not
premises owners; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4905(a) (Supp. 2009) (“No premises owner shall be liable
for any injury to any individual resulting from silica or asbestos exposure unless such individual’s
alleged exposure occurred while the individual was at or near the premises owner’s property.”).
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Supreme Court focuses on foreseeability of the harm in its negligence
jurisprudence.183 In Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings,184 a case of first
impression in Washington regarding take-home asbestos exposure, the
Washington Court of Appeals correctly applied Washington’s
negligence test. The court began its inquiry by examining whether the
harm to the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s
action.185 Reasoning that the harm to a take-home exposure victim could
have been foreseeable, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the
claim and remanded the case for further proceedings.186
A.

The Washington State Supreme Court’s Negligence Test Focuses
on the Foreseeability of the Harm to the Plaintiff

Similar to other jurisdictions that recognize claims for take-home
asbestos exposure,187 the Washington State Supreme Court holds that the
existence of a legal duty depends upon the foreseeability of the harm.188
Foreseeability determines the scope of an actor’s duty to others.189 If an
183. King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974) (concluding city’s wrongful
act caused foreseeable damage, which was compensable even though the exact manner of the injury
was not foreseeable); Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 Wash. 2d 800, 467 P.2d 292 (1970)
(concluding city could properly be forced to compensate visitor to airplane hangar for injuries
sustained by flying debris; city owed a duty based on foreseeability of injury).
184. Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579-7-I, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1 (Wash. App.
Aug. 13, 2007).
185. Id. at *2 (“A risk is ‘unreasonable,’ and thus a party has a duty to prevent resulting harm,
only if a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk. Conversely, if the risk is not foreseeable,
the person who created the risk generally does not have a duty to prevent it.”).
186. Id. at *1.
187. Condon v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. A102069, 2004 WL 1932847, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 31, 2004); Simpkins v. CSX Corp., 929 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Chaisson v.
Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So.2d 171 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d
1143 (N.J. 2006); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation, 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008).
188. King, 84 Wash. 2d at 248, 525 P.2d at 234; Wells, 77 Wash. 2d. at 802, 467 P.2d at 295. A
common law negligence claim requires proof of four factors: (1) the existence of a duty that the
actor owes to the complainant, (2) a breach of such duty, (3) an injury resulting from such a breach,
and (4) proximate causation. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wash. 2d 658, 958 P.2d 301, 308 (1998).
189. Seeberger v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 138 Wash. 2d 815, 982 P.2d 1149 (1999) (concluding
FELA claim against railroad employer could be maintained based on danger posed by tool used to
close grain car door); Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 824 P.2d 483 (1992) (noting that
whether duty was owed to minor to avoid injury from alcohol consumption depended upon whether
such harm was foreseeable); Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989) (concluding
that drinking establishment may be liable for criminal assault by patron, but only if such assault is
foreseeable based on obvious intoxication and notice of propensity for violence); Rucshner v. ADT,
Sec. Sys., Inc., 149 Wash. App. 665, 204 P.3d 271 (2009) (concluding trial court erroneously
dismissed claim against local company that agreed to conduct criminal background check but failed
to do so); Higgins v. Intex Recreation Corp., 123 Wash. App. 821, 99 P.3d 421 (2004) (concluding
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actor affirmatively creates a risk to another, the actor has a responsibility
to prevent foreseeable harm from that risk.190 As such, if the actor does
not take appropriate precautions to prevent such harm, the actor is
responsible for the foreseeable consequences of the risk. 191
B.

The Washington Court of Appeals Applied Washington’s
Negligence Test in Recognizing the Potential Validity of a TakeHome Exposure Claim

In a case that represents a typical take-home exposure claim, Adeline
and Lawrence Rochon filed a lawsuit against Kimberly-Clark,192Mr.
Rochon’s former employer, in 2005.193 The Rochons alleged that the
where risk of injury is not foreseeable, defendant owes no duty to prevent injury); Meneely v. S.R.
Smith, Inc., 101 Wash. App. 845, 5 P.3d 49 (2000) (concluding trial court properly ruled that trade
association owed ultimate consumer of pool equipment a duty to use reasonable care in adopting
safety standards; harm to consumer was foreseeable); Mauch v. Kissling, 56 Wash. App. 312, 783
P.2d 601 (1989) (concluding that scouting organization owed no duty to anticipate potential for
injury from airplane ride furnished to scout).
190. Minahan v. W. Wash. Fair Ass’n, 117 Wash. App. 881, 73 P.3d 1019, 1027 (2003)
(“[E]very actor whose conduct involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect.” (internal citation omitted)).
191. Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 755 P.2d 759, 766 (1988) (concluding social host
serving alcohol did not owe duty to guest to prevent guest’s excessive consumption of alcohol);
Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 Wash. 2d 800, 802, 467 P.2d 292, 295 (1970). According to the
Washington State Supreme Court, “Harm is foreseeable if the risk from which it results was known
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known.” Travis v. Bohannon, 128 Wash.
App. 231, 115 P.3d 342, 346 (2005) (trial court improperly dismissed claim for injuries received by
student during off-campus “workday”); McLeod v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255
P.2d 360, 363 (1953). Additionally, harm is foreseeable if it can “reasonably be perceived as being
within the general field of danger covered by the specific duty owed by the defendant.” Rochon v.
Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579-7-I, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1, *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13,
2007) (citing Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash. 2d 479, 780 P.2d 1307, 1313 (1989)) (internal quotations
omitted). It is not necessary to foresee the exact manner of harm. King, 84 Wash. 2d at 248, 525
P.2d at 234. The actor’s actions do not have to be the sole cause of the harm to another for the actor
to be liable, but must make it more likely than not that harm will result. Fabrique v. Choice Hotels
Int’l, Inc., 144 Wash. App. 675, 183 P.3d 1118, 1122 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). Whether a duty exists
is a question of law that the court determines, and foreseeability is an issue of fact that the jury
usually assesses. Where reasonable minds cannot differ as to foreseeability, the court determines
that issue as matter of law. Estate of Jones v. State, 107 Wash. App. 510, 15 P.3d 180, 184–85
(2000) (where juvenile under supervision for burglary convictions later raped and murdered, issue
of foreseeability on the part of those responsible for supervision was a question for jury); Christen,
113 Wash. 2d at 492, 780 P.2d at 1313; Rikstad v. Holmberg, 76 Wash. 2d 265, 456 P.2d 355, 359
(1969).
192. Lawrence Rochon was employed by Scott Paper Company, the predecessor to KimberlyClark Worldwide, Inc., Kimberly Clark Global Sales, Inc., and Kimberly-Clark Corporation, which
the court collectively referred to as Kimberly-Clark. Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1.
193. Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 052073258 (Snohomish County, Wash. Super.
Ct. filed Mar. 21, 2005).
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employer’s negligence caused Mrs. Rochon to develop mesothelioma as
a result of inhaling asbestos fibers after laundering his work clothes from
1956–1966.194 Mrs. Rochon died of mesothelioma in 2006. The trial
court granted Kimberly-Clark’s motion for summary judgment after
concluding that the company did not owe Mrs. Rochon a duty of care in
its status as an employer and a landowner.195 The court did not find the
foreseeability of her injury relevant.196 In an unpublished opinion, the
Washington Court of Appeals reviewed the decision de novo and
reversed.197
While Kimberly-Clark did not owe Mrs. Rochon a duty as an
employer or a premises owner, the court of appeals held that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the company still owed her a
duty under an ordinary negligence test.198 The court of appeals remanded
the case so the trial court could assess whether Kimberly-Clark
affirmatively created an unreasonable risk that caused Mrs. Rochon’s
mesothelioma.199 The case ultimately settled before Mrs. Rochon’s
negligence claim was retried.200
IV. THE WASHINGTON COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT
IN APPLYING AN ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE TEST
As explained above, the Washington State Supreme Court has not
ruled on a take-home asbestos exposure claim. However, in Rochon, the
Washington Court of Appeals correctly applied Washington’s ordinary
194. Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1.
195. Id. at *2. Mrs. Rochon did not allege that she ever entered the employer’s premises. Id. at
*5.
196. Id. at *2.
197. Id. at *1.
198. Id. at *3.
199. Id. (“Whether Kimberly-Clark knew or should have known about the health risks of asbestos
during the relevant time period, what precautions it should have taken to prevent any resulting harm,
and whether Mrs. Rochon was a foreseeable victim are all questions that are at issue.”). In its
opinion, the court of appeals cited Lunsford v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 125 Wash. App. 784, 106
P.3d 808, 811 (2005), a products liability case against an asbestos manufacturer. Although that case
did not establish whether there is a negligence duty owed to an employee’s household member, the
court determined, as a factual matter, that a family member who launders clothing could be a
foreseeable victim of asbestos exposure. Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *4.
200. The case settled in 2007. E-mail from Matthew Bergman, Att’y at Bergman, Draper, and
Frockt, to author (Feb. 11, 2011, 13:15 PST) (on file with author); Motion to Withdraw Motion to
Publish Opinion, Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007); Court of
Appeals Mandate Terminating Review, Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 11,
2008); Stipulation and Order of Dismissal As to All Remaining Defendants, Rochon v. Saberhagen
Holdings, Inc., No. 052073258 (Snohomish County, Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009).
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negligence test to a take-home exposure claim, ruling in favor of the
plaintiff. This approach is consistent with the Washington State Supreme
Court’s negligence jurisprudence. As a matter of public policy, applying
an ordinary negligence test provides the fairest means for holding a party
liable for creating an unreasonable risk of harm. Washington courts
should follow the Rochon decision when handling future take-home
exposure asbestos claims.
A.

The Washington Court of Appeals Was Correct in Its Interpretation
of Washington Law Regarding Negligence Claims

When ruling on negligence claims, the Washington State Supreme
Court focuses on the foreseeability of the harm.201 If the defendant
affirmatively creates a risk to another, the defendant has a responsibility
to prevent foreseeable harm from that risk.202 If the defendant does not
take proper precautions, it is responsible for the foreseeable
consequences of the actions.203
In determining whether Kimberly-Clark owed a duty to Mrs. Rochon,
the court used the foreseeability of the harm to Mrs. Rochon to
determine whether a duty existed.204 Consistent with Washington law,
the court declined to focus on the relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant.205 The court correctly concluded that if Kimberly-Clark’s
affirmative acts created an unreasonable and foreseeable risk to Mrs.
Rochon, and it failed to protect her from that risk, the company should
be held liable for causing the harm.206

201. King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974); Wells v. City of Vancouver,
77 Wash. 2d 800, 467 P.2d 295 (1970).
202. Minahan v. W. Wash. Fair Ass’n, 117 Wash. App. 881, 897, 73 P.3d 1019, 1027 (2003)
(“[E]very actor whose conduct involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect.” (internal citation omitted)).
203. Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 755 P.2d 759, 766 (1988) (concluding that social
host serving alcohol did not owe duty to guest to prevent guest’s excessive consumption of alcohol);
Wells, 77 Wash. 2d. at 803, 467 P.2d at 295.
204. Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *3 (“Kimberly-Clark may have had no affirmative duty to act
to protect Mrs. Rochon from outside forces, but it had a duty to prevent injury from an unreasonable
risk of harm it had itself created. This assumes, of course, that the risk of harm to Mrs. Rochon was
foreseeable.”).
205. Id. at *2.
206. Id. at *3; see also Burkhart, 110 Wash. 2d at 395, 755 P.2d at 766; Wells, 77 Wash. 2d at
803, 467 P.2d at 295.
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Defendants Should be Held Liable for Creating an Unreasonable
Risk of Harm

In addition to being consistent with Washington negligence law, the
Washington Court of Appeals’ decision in Rochon is consistent with
public policy. Unfortunately, few opportunities exist for take-home
asbestos exposure claimants to seek relief for their injuries. As a result,
these claimants are unable to utilize the same legal theories as
employees.207 An ordinary negligence claim is one of the few options
they have to recover damages for their injuries. In a number of cases,
plaintiffs established that if the employee was exposed to asbestos in the
workplace, it was foreseeable that household members could be exposed
as well.208 Given the risk to magnitude and likelihood of the risk to
household members, it is proper to hold employers accountable.
Applying an ordinary negligence theory is the best way to allow relief
while still preventing an employer from facing endless legal claims.
1.

Applying an Ordinary Negligence Test Provides the Best
Opportunity for Relief

Take-home asbestos exposure claimants have limited means to seek
relief for their injuries. Workers’ compensation statutes do not apply to
those who are not employees injured in the workplace.209 Household

207. See, e.g., Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1, *4 (Wash. App. Aug. 13, 2007) (“Employers
generally owe their employees a duty to provide a reasonably safe work environment. This can even
include the duty to protect employees from outside forces such as the criminal conduct of third
parties. Mrs. Rochon . . . cites to no Washington case extending liability to family members of
employees under this theory.”).
208. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 367 (Tenn. 2008)
(“[Defendant] was aware of the presence of significant quantities of asbestos fibers on its
employees’ work clothes. It was also aware of the dangers posed by even small quantities of
asbestos and that asbestos fibers were being transmitted by its employees to others.”); see also
Condon v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. A102069, 2004 WL 1932847, at *1, *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug.
31, 2004) (finding that expert testimony demonstrated requisite internal knowledge of the dangers
that asbestos posed to both employees and household members).
209. See, e.g., Doty v. Town of S. Prairie, 155 Wash. 2d 527, 120 P.3d 941 (2005) (concluding
that trial court erroneously dismissed claim brought by volunteer firefighter); Gorman v. Garlock,
Inc., 155 Wash. 2d 198, 118 P.3d 311 (2005) (concluding that trial court properly dismissed claim
based on coverage of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act); Garibay v. State,
130 Wash. App. 1042, 128 P.3d 617 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that trial court properly
dismissed claim against Department of Labor and Industries for failure to enforce safety
regulations); Crow v. Boeing Co., 129 Wash. App. 318, 118 P.3d 894 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005)
(concluding that trial court properly dismissed claim against employer where injury was
unintentional); see also Schuchman v. Hoehn, 119 Wash. App. 61, 79 P.3d 6 (2003) (holding that
14-year-old employee’s serious injuries were covered by remedies and limitations of WASH. REV.
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members are not able to rely upon the same legal theories as employees,
such as employer or premises liability, because they were not exposed
while on the employer’s premises.210 While remedies such as strict
liability are available to take-home exposure claimants,211 the elements
of the claim are more difficult to prove.212
Applying an ordinary negligence test to take-home asbestos exposure
cases provides a fair means for relief. Under this test, the plaintiff does
not have to prove an independent “special relationship.”213 Rather, the
test accounts for the fact that there was no legal relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant but for the unreasonable and foreseeable risk
of harm that the defendant affirmatively created.214 If the defendant did
not produce such a risk, the plaintiff would not have suffered harm.215
Alternatively, if the defendant prevented the employee from removing
asbestos from the premises, it might have prevented the plaintiff’s
injuries.216
2.

The Risk of Harm to a Household Member Was Foreseeable

An employer that did not prevent employees from removing asbestos
from the premises created a foreseeable risk of harm to the employee’s
household members.217 OSHA’s 1972 asbestos rule218 reflected scientific

CODE § 52.24.020; no violation of public policy favoring protection of children, nor of the Equal
Protection Clause)
210. Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1, *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007).
211. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 125 Wash. App. 784, 106 P.3d 808 (2009).
212. See id. at 809 (“Manufacturers and sellers of unreasonably dangerous products are strictly
liable for injuries to users and consumers of those products.”). Strict liability is more difficult to
prove because it involves establishing that a specific manufacturer or seller provided the product to
the employer. Then, the household member must be determined to be a “user” or “consumer” of the
product.
213. Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1, *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007) (“In short, even in the
absence of any special relationship between them, Kimberly-Clark had a duty to prevent Mrs.
Rochon’s injury if its use of asbestos was unreasonably risky, and if Mrs. Rochon’s injury was a
foreseeable consequence of its risky actions.”).
214. Id at *3 (“Kimberly-Clark may have had no affirmative duty to act to protect Mrs. Rochon
from outside forces, but it had a duty to prevent injury from an unreasonable risk of harm it had
itself created. This assumes, of course, that the risk of harm to Mrs. Rochon was foreseeable.”).
215. Id.
216. Id. (“Whether Kimberly-Clark knew or should have known about the health risks of asbestos
during the relevant time period, what precautions it should have taken to prevent any resulting harm,
and whether Mrs. Rochon was a foreseeable victim are all questions that are at issue.”).
217. Id. at *4 (citing the conclusion in Lunsford v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 166 Wash. 2d 264,
106 P.3d 808 (2009) and declaring “that, as a factual matter, a family member who launders clothes
could be a foreseeable victim of asbestos exposure is persuasive”).
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data that revealed the risk of asbestos take-home exposure.219 It also
established that where employees used asbestos in the workplace, an
employer should or could have known that there was a potential danger
to those outside the workplace who might come into contact with the
employee’s contaminated clothing.220 In cases in which the plaintiffs
were exposed prior to 1972, like Rochon, plaintiffs have demonstrated
that companies maintained internal or industry knowledge of the risk of
take-home exposure.221
3.

An Employer Is in the Best Position to Prevent Take-Home
Exposure

Household members exposed to asbestos did not voluntarily or
knowingly assume the risk of exposure.222 As symptoms of adverse

218. Standards for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (June 7, 1972) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93a).
219. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So.2d 171, 183 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (“[A]
company aware of the 1972 OSHA standards regarding the hazards of household exposure to
asbestos, had a duty to protect third party household members from exposure to asbestos from a
jobsite it knew contained asbestos.”); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347,
353 (Tenn. 2008) (“Contrary to the OSHA regulations, Alcoa failed to educate Mr. Satterfield and
its other employees regarding the risk of asbestos or how to handle materials containing
asbestos . . . . Alcoa’s employees . . . left the plant each day unaware of the dangers posed by the
asbestos fibers on their contaminated work clothes and without Alcoa making an effort to prevent
others from being exposed to the asbestos fibers on its employees’ clothes.”); Exxon Mobil v.
Altimore, 256 S.W.3d 415, 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (noting the 1972 OSHA regulations were
intended to prevent asbestosis and also concluding that “[b]y 1972, experts agreed that a certain
degree of exposure to asbestos could cause asbestosis or cancer”).
221. See, e.g., Condon v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. A102069, 2004 WL 1932847, at *1, *2–4
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004) (finding that expert testimony demonstrated requisite internal
knowledge of the dangers that asbestos posed to both employees and household members). An
expert for the plaintiff testified that the defendant was a member of the American Petroleum
Institute. He explained that as early as the beginning of the twentieth century, the group’s medical
advisory committee was aware of research that linked lung cancer to industrial carcinogens.
Additionally, he cited recognition in the United States and England that workers handling toxic
substances should have separate lockers for work and street clothes to prevent their families from
being exposed to toxic dust from the workers’ clothes. Id.; Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d
1143, 1149 (N.J. 2006) (citing internal and industry data indicating the risk of asbestos exposure as
early as 1916, and concluding that “Anthony’s soiled work clothing had to be laundered and Exxon
Mobil, as one of the sites at which he worked, should have foreseen that whoever performed that
task would come into contact with the asbestos that infiltrated his clothing while he performed his
contracted tasks”).
222. See, e.g., Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 353 (“Alcoa’s employees, including Mr. Satterfield, left
the plant each day unaware of the dangers posed by the asbestos fibers on their contaminated work
clothes and without Alcoa making an effort to prevent others from being exposed to the asbestos
fibers on its employees’ clothes.”).
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health effects from exposure do not generally develop for at least ten
years,223 household members would have difficulty realizing the dangers
of exposure until they were exposed for a considerable period of time
and suffered irreversible health consequences.
A large employer engaged in interstate commerce, such as KimberlyClark, was in the best position to protect workers exposed to asbestos in
the workplace and therefore, to protect household members.224 It is
reasonable to expect that such an employer had superior access to
information regarding asbestos exposure, such as access to industry
knowledge,225 applicable state or federal statutes or regulations,226 or
relevant scientific data.227 It is also reasonable to expect that the
employer knew that Mr. Rochon’s work involved constant and routine
exposure to asbestos.228 As Mr. Rochon’s work clothes needed to be
laundered, if the employer did not provide a facility to wash the clothing
then it was foreseeable that Mr. Rochon would bring them home to be
laundered.229 A household member such as Mrs. Rochon would not have
had access to such knowledge to appreciate the dangers of asbestos
exposure.230 Even if she were aware of the risk she faced, it would have

223. Asbestos, supra note 62.
224. See, e.g., Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 353 (“Despite the fact that Alcoa was aware of the
dangers posed by asbestos before Mr. Satterfield became an employee, it failed to apprise him or its
other employees of the dangers of asbestos or specifically of the danger associated with wearing
home their asbestos-contaminated work clothes . . . Alcoa’s employees, including Mr. Satterfield,
left the plant each day unaware of the dangers posed by the asbestos fibers on their contaminated
work clothes and without Alcoa making an effort to prevent others from being exposed to the
asbestos fibers on its employees’ clothes.”).
225. See, e.g., Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1149.
226. See, e.g., Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So.2d 171, 183 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (“A
reasonable company. . . a company aware of the 1972 OSHA standards regarding the hazards of
household exposure to asbestos, had a duty to protect third party household members from exposure
to asbestos from a jobsite it knew contained asbestos.”).
227. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil v. Altimore, 256 S.W.3d 415, 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (“By 1972,
experts agreed that a certain degree of exposure to asbestos could cause asbestosis or cancer.”).
228. Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579-7-I, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1, *3 (Wash.
Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007) (“According to her allegations, Kimberly-Clark used asbestos in an unsafe
manner and required Mr. Rochon to work with and around asbestos as part of his job.”); see also
Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 353 (“Alcoa failed to educate Mr. Satterfield and its other employees
regarding the risk of asbestos or how to handle materials containing asbestos. Even though Alcoa’s
employees worked extensively with materials containing asbestos, these materials did not contain
warning labels or notices stating that they contained asbestos.”).
229. See, e.g., Simpkins v. CSX Corp., 929 N.E.2d 1257, 1264 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Olivo, 895
A.2d at 1149; Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 353.
230. See, e.g., Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 353 (“Despite the fact that Alcoa was aware of the
dangers posed by asbestos before Mr. Satterfield became an employee, it failed to apprise him or its
other employees of the dangers of asbestos or specifically of the danger associated with wearing

09 - 051611_Levine_Final_Read[1].docx (Do Not Delete)

2011]

5/28/2011 4:31 PM

CLEARING THE AIR

391

been difficult for her to protect herself from the asbestos that her
husband carried home if he were not able to wash the clothing, shower,
or otherwise remove the asbestos before returning home.231
4.

Holding an Employer Liable for Take-Home Exposure Will Not
Lead to Endless Litigation

Holding an employer–defendant liable for asbestos take-home
exposure will not subject the defendant to unlimited liability. In
determining whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff must establish that the harm was a foreseeable consequence of
the defendant’s actions.232 Accordingly, if a plaintiff is unable to
demonstrate that the defendant should have had the requisite knowledge
of the risk at the time of exposure, the harm was not foreseeable.233
For a valid take-home exposure claim, a plaintiff also has to
demonstrate that the harm is attributable to the risks that the defendant
itself created.234 The defendant would not be liable for a third party’s
acts or for circumstances that it did not create.235 Another reason that the
defendant would not be exposed to unlimited liability is that if the court
finds that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty as a matter of law, the
fact-finder can limit the scope of the duty at the causation stage of the
negligence analysis.236 At that stage, the fact-finder can limit the duty in
home their asbestos-contaminated work clothes . . . Alcoa’s employees, including Mr. Satterfield,
left the plant each day unaware of the dangers posed by the asbestos fibers on their contaminated
work clothes and without Alcoa making an effort to prevent others from being exposed to the
asbestos fibers on its employees’ clothes.”).
231. See, e.g., Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1149 (N.J. 2006) (“Anthony’s soiled
work clothing had to be laundered and Exxon Mobil, as one of the sites at which he worked, should
have foreseen that whoever performed that task would come into contact with the asbestos that
infiltrated his clothing while he performed his contracted tasks.”).
232. Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 755 P.2d 759, 766 (1988) (concluding that social
host serving alcohol did not owe duty to guest to prevent guest’s excessive consumption of alcohol);
Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 Wash. 2d 800, 802, 467 P.2d 292, 295 (1970) (holding that city
could properly be forced to compensate visitor to airplane hangar for injuries sustained by flying
debris; city owed a duty based on foreseeability of injury).
233. Harm is foreseeable “if the risk from which it results was known or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have been known.” Travis v. Bohannon, 128 Wash. App. 231, 115 P.3d 342,
346 (2005); McLeod v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953).
234. Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579-7-I, 2007 WL 2325214, at *4 (Wash. Ct.
App. Aug. 13, 2007) (“[T]he duty is only one to act reasonably to prevent injury from KimberlyClark’s own risky acts, not to protect Mrs. Rochon from the acts of third parties or from
circumstances it did not create.”).
235. Id. at *4.
236. Id. (“[C]ourts exercise their gatekeeping function in determining whether liability should
attach through the legal causation element, and juries must decide whether the negligence actually
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determining whether the defendant’s actions were both the cause-in-fact
and legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.237 In order to control the
number of take-home exposure claims, a court could limit the scope of
the duty to household members or to immediate family members.
CONCLUSION
The Rochons represent typical plaintiffs in asbestos take-home
exposure cases. In their case, the Washington Court of Appeals applied
an ordinary negligence test that is consistent with the Washington State
Supreme Court and other jurisdictions that follow a similar negligence
scheme. A number of policy considerations also support this approach.
The test that the court of appeals applied in Rochon represents an
important means to empower plaintiffs who might otherwise be unable
to seek relief from the party responsible for their suffering. Mrs. Rochon
did not have access to requisite knowledge regarding the threat of
asbestos exposure, nor did she have access to the means to properly
protect herself from the risk that the defendant created. For those
reasons, it is proper to place the burden on the defendant employer, who
had both superior knowledge of the risk and a greater capacity to prevent
employees from carrying asbestos off of the premises and into the home.
In order to avoid inundating the courts and employers with frivolous
claims, the scope of the duty is limited based on the foreseeability of the
harm from the risk that the employer affirmatively created. Because
asbestosis and mesothelioma only develop as a consequence of longterm exposure to asbestos, individuals who were only exposed to the
worker or the worker’s clothing for very limited periods of time would
be less likely to develop these conditions. The actual impact of asbestos
take-home litigation remains unclear, particularly given the lack of data
on the potential number of plaintiffs. As these claims arise, it is essential
that the courts hold responsible those parties who affirmatively created a
public health risk and failed to take appropriate action to prevent
resulting harm.

caused the injury before liability will attach.” (citing Keller v. City of Spokane, 146 Wash. 2d 237,
252 n.15, 44 P.3d 845, 853 n.15 (2002))).
237. Id.

